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Voice, Representation and Trust in Parliament  
 
Abstract: The procedural justice literature argues that providing individuals voice in 
institutional processes facilitates trust in that institution.  For democratic institutions, voice is 
provided to the citizenry via political representation.  In this article, I apply the procedural 
justice argument to trust in parliament, equating representation with voice: if individuals 
believe they are represented in parliament, they will trust parliament more than if they believe 
otherwise.  Analyses of data from three of four countries find support for this argument: those 
individuals who believe that a party with at least one seat in parliament represents their views 
trust parliament more than those who do not.  This relationship holds even when accounting 
for political self-interest.  For those who wish to promote trust in parliament, a suggested 
normative good with a host of politically important consequences, one potential pathway is to 
facilitate individuals belief that there is a party in parliament that represents them. 
 
Keywords: Voice, Representation, Trust in Parliament, Procedural Justice, Left-Right 
Congruence 
  
Modern representative democracy requires citizens to authorize a small group of political 
elites to govern in their stead.  This process entails that citizens trust that their elected 
representatives will advocate for their interests in the processes of government.  Recent 
research, built on the procedural justice literature, argues that individuals trust parliament 
more if they believe they have a voice (i.e., the ability to express ones political preferences), 
in the form of a selected representative, in the policy-making process (Dunn, 2012).  As the 
overwhelming majority of individuals never participate directly in parliament, they instead 
gain voice through representation.  Individuals will thereby trust parliament more when their 
elected representative is perceived to advocate for their political preferences in the policy-
making process. 
Research in the representative congruence literature argues, either explicitly or implicitly, 
that electors and representatives should align on some relevant measure(s) of policy 
preference, often Left-Right identification/classification (Andeweg, 2011; Blais & Bodet, 
2006; Dalton, Farrell, & McAllister, 2011; Golder & Stramski, 2010; Holmberg, 2011; Huber 
& Powell, 1994; M. Kim, 2009; Powell, 2009).  Though there is debate regarding whether 
alignment results from bottom-up or top-down processes (or some combination of both), in 
any case, ideological alignment is suggested to be of central importance, with democratic 
representation considered normatively better where the policy preferences of the electorate 
and the parliament are ideologically congruent.  Specifically, the congruence literature argues 
that the ideological distribution of the parliament should, as closely as possible, match that of 
the electorate.  There are however, other ways of conceiving of representation, descriptive 
representation being the most readily apparent (cf., Mansbridge, 1999).  Certain conceptions 
of representation suggest that parliament should act as the political voice of the electorate in 
the policy-making process.  Verba (1993, p. 677) argues that a bedrock principle of modern 
democracy states that in what the government does, the preferences and interests of each 
citizen ought to be given equal consideration.  Modern democratic representation should 
therefore make voice its most active and consonant manifestation and judgment about just 
and unjust laws and policies its content (Urbinati, 2006, p. 19).  Though this argument does 
not necessarily translate to the equivalent individual-level argument that an individual 
representative act as the voice of his or her elector, from the perspective of the elector, this is 
precisely the purpose of a representative.  For the individual-level perspective, a 
representative is a person or party chosen to provide voice to the elector in the policy-making 
process. 
An individual perceives himself to have voice in the policy-making process, then, when he 
believes a party in parliament is representative of his interests, however an individual may 
define such.  Since an individual tends to trust an institution (or process) more where he 
perceives himself to have a voice in the institution (or process) (Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; 
Grimes, 2006; van den Bos, Wilke, & Lind, 1998), he will trust parliament more if he 
perceives that a party which holds at least one seat in parliament represents his interests.  This 
article examines this hypothesis using data from recent waves of the Austrian, Dutch, New 
Zealand and Swiss Election Studies.  Regression analyses indicate that believing one is 
represented by a party in parliament does, in most cases examined, result in a higher level of 
trust in parliament. 
Trust and Voice in Parliament 
Political trust has been an issue of interest to political scientists for decades.  Political trust is 
often considered a fundamental indicator of the health and legitimacy of a democracy and 
crucial to its stability.  Mishler and Rose (2001), for example, state that popular trust in 
political institutions is vital to democracy.  In addition to normative concerns, a number of 
quantitative investigations demonstrate that political trust impacts such political attitudes and 
behaviors as policy preferences (Hetherington, 2005), voter turnout (Cox, 2003; Grönlund & 
Setälä, 2007), vote-choice (Bélanger & Nadeau, 2005; Hetherington, 1999; Hooghe, Marien, 
& Pauwels, 2011), and perceived acceptability of illegal behavior (Marien & Hooghe, 2011).  
Political trust affects not only the normative legitimacy of democratic governance but also 
substantive outcomes associated with that governance. 
The various facets and levels of political trust have gradually been fleshed out as research in 
this area has evolved.  Political trust covers a spectrum divided into five (perhaps not so 
distinct, cf., Bowler & Karp, 2004) categories which proceed from diffuse to specific support 
(Easton, 1965, 1975): political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime 
institutions, and political actors (Norris, 1999a).  As the institution most often referred to as 
the voice of the people and most often studied by those interested in representation, this paper 
focuses on trust in parliament, one aspect of the second most specific level of political trust, 
trust in regime institutions. 
Trust in parliament is undoubtedly the result of myriad factors, some self-interested, some 
beneficent, some cognitive, and some affective.  One recent suggestion regards the influence 
perceived voice exerts on trust in parliament (Dunn, 2012).  This argument, developed from 
theory and evidence from the procedural justice literature, states that an individual will trust 
parliament more if he believes he has a voice in the parliament via a self-selected 
representative. 
In modern representative democracy, individuals necessarily grant representatives the power 
to act on their behalf in the processes of governing (cf., Montesquieu, 2002 [1748]).  In doing 
so, they abdicate control of their political lives to others and thereby place themselves at risk 
of neglect, harm, or worse.  Even though unable to act on their own behalf, when individuals 
are given the opportunity to express their interests as respected members of the community 
(Anand, 2001; Folger, 1977; Lind, Kanfer, & Earley, 1990; Lind & Tyler, 1988; Tyler & 
Blader, 2003; Tyler & Lind, 1992), they gain a sense of control (van Prooijen, 2009) and 
certainty about the future (Lind & van den Bos, 2002) that they may otherwise lack.  A 
perception of dignity and voice builds trust where authority is exercised by another whom 
one does not personally know and whose actions one cannot directly control (Culnan & 
Armstrong, 1999; van den Bos, et al., 1998).  Individuals are thereby more likely to trust 
institutions where they perceive themselves to have a voice in those decisions that affect them 
and their community. 
Importantly, the impact of perceived voice on the perception of fair process and trust in 
institutions goes above and beyond simple self-interest; even when outcomes are negative, 
the process by which those outcomes are reached is of considerable importance for individual 
perceptions of fairness and trust.  The perception of voice often results in the belief that the 
outcome, even if negative, is fair (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1978; Walker, 
Lind, & Thibaut, 1979) which, in turn, produces greater levels of institutional trust (Culnan & 
Armstrong, 1999; W. C. Kim & Mauborgne, 2003).  A desire for voice is not simply the 
expression of a desire for favorable outcomes, but a desire to be a valued member of the 
group.  Perceived provision of voice, believing that ones voice is heard and acknowledged, 
facilitates trust in those institutions where authority is held by another. 
This is, of course, not to say that self-interest plays no part in the level of trust one expresses 
in institutions.  Procedural justice research often finds that individuals trust processes and 
institutions more where those processes and institutions serve their self-interest (e.g., 
Korsgaard, Schweiger, & Sapienza, 1995; Lind, et al., 1990; Tyler, 1994).  A number of 
studies of trust in political institutions indicate that trust is higher among electoral or policy 
winners  i.e., among those individuals who voted for or agree with the policy outputs of 
those currently in power (Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 2003; 
Hetherington, 1998; Miller, 1974; Miller & Borrelli, 1991; Norris, 1999b).  As with 
nonpolitical institutions, trust in political institutions will likely result from a mixture of 
perception of voice and self-interested outcomes, among other things. 
Individuals express greater trust in an institution when they believe they have a voice in that 
institution, even when that institution produces outcomes they do not agree with.  In political 
terms, individuals will report greater trust in parliament if they feel they are represented in 
parliament even if the government is controlled by a non-favored party or coalition.  Based 
on the proposed relationship, I derive and test the following prediction: 
P1: Trust in parliament will be positively related to perceived representation by a party with 
at least one seat in parliament. 
Data and Measurement 
There are two variables needed to examine the above prediction: trust in parliament and 
perceived representation by a party in parliament.  There are a number of surveys that include 
a confidence or trust in parliament inquiry, with both of these items often used as indicators 
of trust in parliament.  The second variable, perceived representation, is less straightforward.  
There are two measures that appear in a number of election surveys that can be considered to 
measure such.  The first directly inquires as to whether the respondent feels represented by a 
political party, and if so, which one.  Linking this question to the most recent parliamentary 
election allows one to determine whether the respondent feels represented by a party with at 
least one seat in parliament.  The second and less direct measure, is whether an individuals 
vote-choice is perceived to be ideologically proximate to their own Left-Right placement.  
This is a one-to-one measure of ideological-congruence (Golder & Stramski, 2010) that 
utilizes intra-individual perceptions of the respondents own and his vote-choices location on 
the Left-Right scale; an ideological-congruence measure that avoids differential item 
functioning (DIF) issues which can arise due to assuming inter-individual measurement 
equivalency where it does not exist (Aldrich & McKelvey, 1977; King, Murray, Salomon, & 
Tandon, 2004).  This second measure makes the rather large assumptions that Left-Right 
placements of self and parties mean something to the respondent and that perceived 
congruence between these placements is equivalent to representation.  Both the empirical and 
theoretical literature provide numerous arguments both for and against each of these 
assumptions.  It is therefore preferable to use the former measure, or at least to confirm the 
convergent validity of the latter measure against the former. 
Ideally, I would prefer to examine my stated hypothesis using data from a large-scale cross-
country survey.  This would ensure that any findings resulting from the analyses were 
applicable regardless of the political environment.  This would also allow me to examine any 
potential conditioning factors  such as whether certain electoral systems or regime types 
condition the relationship between representation and trust in parliament. 
Unfortunately, there is currently no large-scale cross-country dataset that provides both a 
confidence/trust in parliament measure and both, or even one, of the perceived representation 
measures.  There are a small number of relatively recent election studies that include the trust 
in parliament inquiry and inquiries relevant to creating both of the perceived representation 
measures: the 2009 Austrian National Election Study (AUTNES; http://www.autnes.at/), the 
2002 Dutch Parliamentary Election Study (DPES; http://www.dpes.nl/), the 2002 and 2008 
New Zealand Election Studies (NZES; http://nzes.org), and the 2007 Swiss Election Study 
(SELECTS; http://www2.unil.ch/selects/).  Each of these surveys provide the necessary 
individual-level data on trust in parliament, whether one feels represented by a political party 
(and which one), ideological self-identification, the perception of the ideological placement 
of major parties, and vote-choice, as well as a number of theoretically relevant control 
variables.  This limited selection of cases restricts the conclusions that can be drawn from the 
following analyses, but does allow me to determine whether the hypothesis receives support 
in at least a handful of Established Democracies. 
The 2009 Austrian National Election Survey is a post-election survey of 1,165 enfranchised 
Austrian residents aged 18 and above.  The fieldwork was conducted in German using 
computer assisted personal interviewing.  The sample was drawn using multiple stratification 
with a clustered address random procedure (Kritzinger et al., 2013). 
The 2002 Dutch Parliamentary Election Survey is a pre- and post-election survey of 1574 
residents.  The trust in parliament question is asked in the post-election survey, while the 
representation-relevant questions (see below) are split between the pre- and post election 
surveys.  The interviews were conducted using computer assisted personal interviewing for 
all the pre-election interviews as well as for a majority of re-interviewees  a minority of re-
interviewees were surveyed via self-administered surveys.  The sample was drawn using a 
random sample of telephone numbers from a random sample of municipalities. 
The 2002 New Zealand Election Survey is a post-election survey of 5783 enfranchised 
residents aged 18 and above.  Respondents completed the survey using mail and telephone 
questionnaires.  The sample consists of both a new general sample and follow-up panel 
samples.  Both sample groups were randomly selected from the electoral register, 
proportionate to each of the then 62 regular parliamentary electorates; the 7 Maori electorates 
were oversampled and therefore not proportionately sampled.  The 2008 sample was gathered 
similarly, consisting of 3042 individuals, including an oversample of 636 Maori. 
The 2007 Swiss Election Survey is a post-election survey of 4392 Swiss citizens.  The sample 
consists of a nationally representative sample mixed with an oversampling of small cantons 
to ensure at least 100 interviews per canton. 
The dependent variable is an individual's trust in parliament.  For Austria, this variable is 
determined via reference to the respondent's answer to the following inquiry: "How much do 
you trust the Austrian parliament?"  For the Netherlands: How much trust do you have in 
the Second Chamber?  For New Zealand in 2002: please indicate how much trust and 
confidence would you say you have in parliament.  For New Zealand in 2008: "please 
indicate how much trust and confidence you have in Parliament."  For Switzerland: Please 
tell me for each institution how much trust you have in it: Parliament.  Unfortunately, 
there is a diverse range of possible responses for each case, with only Austria and 
Switzerland using a similar metric, making any comparison between countries difficult.  
However, to provide some sense of comparison, I transform trust in parliament in each case 
to range from 0 to 1, inclusive.  With the above caveat in mind, in order from the lowest to 
the highest transformed mean: New Zealand (2002) = 0.542, Netherlands (2002) = 0.575, 
Austria (2008) = 0.580, New Zealand (2008) = 0.581, and Switzerland (2007) = 0.642.  
Comparison of means using a two-sample t-statistic indicates that 7 of the 10 comparisons 
yield statistically significant differences, with New Zealand (2002) being significantly lower 
and Switzerland (2007) being significantly higher than the three middle-level cases, and each 
other; the three middle-level cases are statistically indistinguishable from one another. 
Above, I suggest two possible indicators of whether an individual believes he is represented 
in parliament.  The first uses a more direct tact, asking whether the individual feels 
represented by a political party and then determining whether that party holds a seat in 
parliament.  The question for the AUTNES reads: Would you say that any of the parties in 
Austria represent your views reasonably well?  For the DPES (pre-election survey): Is there 
in the Netherlands a political party which on the whole reflects or represents your opinion 
best?  For both iterations of the NZES: Would you say that any of the parties in New 
Zealand represent your views reasonably well?  And for the SELECTS: Is there a party that 
represents your personal views well?  A follow-up question inquires as to which party.  If 
the reported party holds at least one seat in parliament, the individual is coded as believing 
(s)he is represented by a party in parliament (=1). If the person responds with a no to the 
initial inquiry or does not answer either question, the individual is coded as not believing 
(s)he is represented by a party in parliament (=0).  There is considerable difference between 
cases in the proportion of people who believe they are represented according to this measure: 
Switzerland reports the lowest proportion of people who believe they are represented, at 
0.437, followed by New Zealand (2002) at 0.656, Austria at 0.611, the Netherlands at 0.705, 
and New Zealand (2008) at 0.811. 
One drawback to this measure: as a result of each country relying on either a proportional or 
mixed-member proportional representation electoral system, an overwhelming majority of 
respondents who report a party, report a party that is represented in the parliament.  This 
means there is very little difference between this measure and a measure simply coding 
whether a person feels represented by a political party. 
The second possibility suggested above is a measure of vote-congruence, a respondents 
perceived Left-Right congruence between himself and his reported vote choice.  This variable 
is determined via reference to the respondent's Left-Right self-placement, his/her reported 
vote choice, and his/her perception of the Left-Right placement of his/her vote choice.  In 
Austria, the respondent's perception of the Left-Right placement of political parties is 
determined via reference to the following question: "In politics people sometimes talk of left 
and right. Thinking of the parties in Austria, where would you place the following parties on 
a scale from 1 to 11 where 1 means the left and 11 means the right?"  Respondents were 
asked to place the following parties: SPÖ, ÖVP, FPÖ, Grüne, BZÖ, LIF, and Liste 
Dinkhauser.  Respondents in the Netherlands were asked a substantively similar question and 
asked to place the following parties: PvdA, VVD, D66, GroenLinks, CDA, SGP, 
ChristenUnie, Leefbaar Nederland, SP, and Lijst Pim Fortuyn.  For the 2002 New Zealand 
election survey respondents were asked to place the following parties: National, Labour, New 
Zealand First, Alliance, Act, Green, Progressive Coalition, and United Future.  For the 2008 
New Zealand election survey: National, Labour, NZ First, United Future, Act, Green Party, 
Progressive, and the Maori Party.  For the Swiss election survey: CVP, FDP, SP, SVP, 
Gruene, LPS, EVP, and LEGA.  The request for Left-Right party placement was followed by 
a request for the respondent to place themselves on the same scale.  In Austria, for example: 
"And what about yourself? Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 
means left and 11 means right?"  For the Netherlands, both the self- and party-placement 
inquiries were asked in the post-election survey.  An individual's vote choice is determined 
via reference to a question directly asking if the respondent voted in the recent elections, and 
if so, for which party. 
The respondent's vote-congruence is equal to ten minus the absolute value of the difference 
between the respondent's Left-Right placement and the Left-Right placement of his vote-
choice.  This produces an individual-level Left-Right-congruence score ranging from 0 to 10 
with 10 being a precise match and 0 being the most extreme mismatch.  Though this variable 
can range from 0 to 10, for Austria vote-congruence ranges from 1 to 10 and in the 
Netherlands, from 3 to 10.  The distribution is heavily negatively skewed with the mean 
ranging from 8.569 (in Switzerland) to 8.997 (in the Netherlands); over 90% of respondents 
in each case (who were not removed from the analyses due to missing data) score between 7 
and 10, inclusive. 
Issues of accuracy in the Left-Right placement of parties, and therefore issues of projection 
bias (seeing ones vote choice as ideologically more similar to oneself than is actually the 
case), are not an issue with this measure as it is solely concerned with individuals 
perceptions.  The argument in this paper, as well as in the procedural justice literature in 
general, is that the perception of voice matters for trust; in fact, it is precisely the relevance of 
perception over reality that leads some authors to express concerns regarding the potential of 
elite manipulation of perception to elicit trust in potentially unjust institutions (Cohen, 1989; 
Dunn, 2012). 
Examining the relationship between the two suggested independent variables gives reason to 
suspect that perceived Left-Right vote-congruence may not accurately reflect whether an 
individual believes he is represented.  Table 1 presents the output from three separate 
analyses analyzing the relationship between the two measures.  The first analysis is a simple 
difference in means test between the vote-congruence scores of those who believe they are 
represented by a party in parliament and those who do not.  Those who believe they are 
represented in parliament have a higher mean vote-congruence score than those who do not, 
and this difference is significant in three of the five cases analyzed: Austria (2008), the 
Netherlands (2002), and New Zealand (2002).  There is a non-significant difference for New 
Zealand (2008) and Switzerland (2007).  Pairwise correlations echo this result.  There are 
minimal and inconsistently significant correlations between vote-congruence and whether 
one feels represented in parliament.  A logistic regression of feeling represented on vote-
congruence again echoes these results indicating that the predicted probability of feeling 
represented is higher for those with a higher level of vote-congruence, but this increase in 
probability is only significantly different from zero in the same three cases noted above. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
These two variables, though somewhat related in three of the five cases examined here, are 
clearly measuring different concepts (or are substantially differentially susceptible to noise); 
though these concepts are certainly related to some degree in three of the five cases.  As the 
more direct measure possesses a higher degree of face validity, I will focus primarily on this 
variable from here on.  However, I retain the vote-congruence measure for inclusion in the 
following analyses as this variable is at least a face-valid indicator of how an individual 
perceives his relationship to his vote choice in terms of the Left-Right continuum. 
In addition to the variables discussed above, research often argues for the inclusion of a 
number of other relevant variables hypothesized to influence political trust: age; education; 
gender; whether an individuals vote choice is included in government (electoral winner); an 
individuals Left-Right identification; and an individuals perception of the health of the 
economy (perception of economy) (e.g., Anderson & LoTempio, 2002; Banducci & Karp, 
2003; Norris, 1999a). 
Perception of the Economy: The perception of economy variable reflects the respondent's 
view of the state of the economy.  The measurement of this variable varies from country to 
country though it is intended to capture perceptions of economic health.  In Austria this 
variable is measured via reference to the following question: "How would you evaluate, very 
generally, the current economic situation of Austria?"  In the Netherlands: do you think that 
the economic situation has been influenced favorably, unfavorably or neither by the 
government policies?  In New Zealand 2002 and 2008: "How do you think the general 
economic situation in the country now compares with a year ago?"  In Switzerland: In your 
opinion: how is the current economic situation in Switzerland?  Each of these questions 
takes a slightly different approach to the intended concept and as such, the variable has 
slightly different meaning in each country.  Nevertheless, the variable does, in each case, 
measure a respondents perception of the economy, whether from an absolute perspective or 
relative to an earlier point of comparison.  Higher values for this variable indicate a more 
negative view of the economy and should therefore be negatively related to trust in 
parliament. 
Left-Right Identification: This variable indicates the respondent's Left-Right identification 
and is measured, as noted above, by reference to the following question in Austria and a 
substantively similar question in each of the other 4 surveys: "In politics people sometimes 
talk of left and right Where would you place yourself on a scale from 1 to 11, where 1 
means left and 11 means right?" 
Electoral Winner: This variable reflects whether the respondent's vote choice is represented 
in government, in the cabinet.  Following the 2008 election, the Austrian cabinet consisted of 
members of the Social Democratic Party (SPÖ) and the Austrian People's Party (ÖVP).  In 
the Netherlands, following the 2002 election, the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), List 
Pim Fortuyn (PFL), and the Peoples Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) formed the 
cabinet.  Following the 2002 New Zealand elections, Labour and the Progressives formed the 
cabinet and following the 2008 election, the National party formed a minority government.  
After the 2007 Swiss elections, the Federal Council consisted of members of the Liberals 
(FDP), Christian Democratic Peoples Party (CVP), Social Democratic Party (SP), and Swiss 
Peoples Party (SVP) as it has for decades due to the magic formula (cf., Ladner, 2001).  
This variable is coded 1 if a person's vote choice is in the cabinet and 0 otherwise. 
An individual's age is an approximate measure determined by subtracting the respondent's 
birth year from the year of the survey; gender is coded 0 for female and 1 for male; education 
is measured by reference to years of education in Austria and by level of education in the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, and Switzerland, with higher values indicating a longer duration 
or higher level of education; political interest is based on a question inquiring into how 
interested in politics the respondent is, with higher values corresponding to greater interest.  
Table A1 in appendix A provides a brief summary of the variables for each country. 
The following analyses rely on datasets created using listwise deletion of missing data.  
Appendix B reports analyses using data derived from multiple imputation by chained 
equations (cf., Azur, Stuart, Frangakis, & Leaf, 2011; Royston & White, 2011; White, 
Royston, & Wood, 2011). 
Analysis 
The data are analyzed separately for each country using ordinary least squares regression for 
Austria, New Zealand and Switzerland and ordered logistic regression for the Netherlands.  
The outputs of the regression analyses are displayed in Tables 2a, 2b, and 2c. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Tables 2a and 2b display both the non-standardized and the standardized coefficients for the 
OLS regression models  Austria, New Zealand and Switzerland.  Table 2c displays the log 
odds and the odds ratios for the ordered logistical regression  the Netherlands.  Of the 5 
cases, 4 demonstrate significant results for the relationship between perceived representation 
and trust in parliament.  In Austria, the difference between not believing one is represented 
and believing one is represented predicts a 1.065 unit increase in the trust in parliament 
variable, from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 5.147 (all other variables 
held at their mean), to just above the mean at 6.212; this corresponds to 0.413 standard 
deviation change in trust in parliament, jumping from -0.253 standard deviations below the 
mean to 0.161 standard deviations above.  Of the variables included in the model, perceived 
representation demonstrates the most substantial relationship (in terms of standardized 
coefficients) with trust in parliament in Austria.   
In the Netherlands, moving from not believing one is represented to believing one is 
represented corresponds with a 0.417 unit increase in the ordered log-odds of reporting a 
higher category of trust in parliament, or 1.517 times greater than the odds of reporting a 
lower category.  With the move from not believing one is represented to believing one is 
represented, the probability of reporting absolutely no trust decreases from 0.022 to 0.014, 
the probability of reporting not so much trust falls from 0.337 to 0.255, the probability of 
reporting fairly much trust increases from 0.608 to 0.681, and the probability of reporting 
very much trust increases from 0.033 to 0.049. 
In New Zealand in 2002, the difference between not believing one is represented and 
believing one is represented predicts a 0.248 unit increase in the trust in parliament variable, 
from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 4.172, to just above the mean at 
4.420; this corresponds to 0.142 standard deviation change in trust in parliament, jumping 
from -0.093 standard deviations below the mean to 0.049 standard deviations above.  In terms 
of relative impact, perceived representation lags behind all other significant variables save 
gender. 
In New Zealand in 2008, the difference between not believing one is represented and 
believing one is represented corresponds with a 0.572 unit increase in the trust in parliament 
variable, from just below the mean score of trust in parliament at 4.760, to just above the 
mean at 5.333; this corresponds to 0.329 standard deviation change in trust in parliament, 
jumping from -0.267 standard deviations below the mean to 0.062 standard deviations above.  
For relative impact, perceived represented places third, behind education and political 
interest. 
For Switzerland, this relationship is neither statistically nor substantively significant.  As 
Switzerland is a fairly unique case among the four countries there are a number of reasons 
this may be the case, be it the countrys federal design accommodating four linguistic/cultural 
regions or the seven-member relatively-fixed multi-party executive. 
Vote-congruence is a less consistent predictor of trust in parliament.  This relationship attains 
significance only in Austria and New Zealand in 2008.  For these cases, perceived ideological 
congruence with ones vote choice independently and positively contributes to trust in 
parliament above and beyond perceived representation, though it exerts less impact than 
perceived representation. 
The control variables, where they attain significance, act much as previous research leads us 
to expect.  However, of the control variables, only two, age and negative perception of the 
economy, are consistently significantly related to trust in parliament.  Age, though 
consistently related to trust in parliament, varies the polarity of its relationship among 
countries.  In Austria and New Zealand, this variable is positively related to trust in 
parliament, with older age cohorts more trusting of parliament.  In the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, this variable is negatively related to trust in parliament, with older cohorts less 
trusting of parliament.  A negative perception of the economy is consistently negatively 
related to trust in parliament; a negative perception of the economy predicts less trust in 
parliament. 
Education, Left-Right identification, political interest, and surprisingly, even whether one is 
an electoral winner are all only inconsistently related to trust in parliament.  Education 
achieves significance and is positively related to trust in parliament in Austria and New 
Zealand; for Austria, a greater number of years in education predicts a higher level of trust in 
parliament; for New Zealand, a higher level of education predicts a higher level of trust in 
parliament.  Left-Right identification achieves significance and is positively related to trust in 
parliament in New Zealand in 2008 and in Switzerland and negatively related to trust in 
parliament in the Netherlands; so whereas the those who identify with the Right are more 
trusting of parliament in New Zealand in 2008 and Switzerland, those who identify with the 
Left are more trusting of parliament in the Netherlands.  Political interest achieves 
significance only in Austria, the Netherlands, and in New Zealand in 2008 where it is 
positively related to trust in parliament; those who are more interested in politics report a 
higher level of trust in parliament. 
Of the control variables, the most surprising result is that whether one voted for a party in 
government, and thereby one of the dominant coalition in parliament, is not significantly 
related to trust in parliament in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Plausible reasons for this 
that are most apparent are the relatively consensual and fixed nature of the party composition 
of the Swiss Federal Council (though, see Church, 2008) and the political turmoil following 
the assassination of Pim Fortuyn (whose internally conflicted and controversial party, PFL, 
formed part of the governing coalition following the 2002 election) during the 2002 election 
campaign (cf., Pennings & Keman, 2003). 
Similar to other research on individual levels of political trust (e.g., Bélanger & Nadeau, 
2005; Bowler & Karp, 2004; Mishler & Rose, 2001), the models examined here do not 
explain a great deal of the variance in the trust in parliament variable.  Four of the models 
explain less than 10% of the variance of trust in parliament, with those of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland explaining less than even 5%.  Austria is the exception, with the included 
variables explaining slightly over 17% of the variance of trust in parliament. 
Conclusion 
Political trust, considered a normative good by many, impacts political attitudes and behavior 
in a variety of ways, exerting a definitive impact on a countrys political climate.  In seeking 
to understand political attitudes and behavior we are thereby encouraged to also understand 
political trust.  This article looks at political trust, specifically trust in parliament, from the 
perspective of the procedural justice literature.   
The literature on procedural fairness provides decades of evidence that perceived voice in a 
process increases individuals trust in the process and the institution responsible for the 
process.  Dunn (2012) extends this research into the political trust literature in an analysis of 
the effect of electoral systems on individually-held levels of trust in parliament, finding that 
voice in parliament (measured as the form and proportionality of the electoral system) 
predicts greater trust in parliament.  This research argues that an individual will trust 
parliament more if the individual has a voice in that institution, but never directly measures 
whether an individual perceives that he has a voice in parliament.  This paper resolves this by 
utilizing the concept of representation. 
The proposition that democratic representatives should provide voice (i.e., the ability to 
express ones political preferences) to their constituents is common in political theory (e.g., 
Mansbridge, 2009; Mill, 1861; Urbinati, 2006; Williams, 1998) and is often echoed, at least 
cursorily, in recent quantitative research (e.g., Blais & Bodet, 2006; Golder & Stramski, 
2010; Pande, 2003; Powell, 2006).  In this sense, this article equates voice with democratic 
representation: an individual believes he is represented in parliament insofar as he believes 
that a representative in parliament provides him the ability to express his political preferences 
in the processes undertaken by parliament. 
This train of reasoning leads me to predict that individuals will trust parliament more if they 
believe they are represented in parliament.  Making use of five electoral surveys of four 
countries, this article tests whether believing one is represented by a party in parliament 
corresponds with a higher level of political trust.  In three of the four countries, and four of 
the five cases (Austria 2009, the Netherlands 2002, New Zealand 2002, New Zealand 2008), 
believing one is represented by a party in parliament does correspond with a higher level of 
political trust.  However, in Switzerland 2007, there is no significant relationship between 
believing one is represented and trust in parliament.  Though there is confirmation of this 
relationship in four of the five cases studied, the absence of any relationship in 2007 
Switzerland suggests caution.  Nevertheless, there is certainly reason to suggest that, in 
general, believing that one has a voice in parliament leads one to trust parliament more than 
one otherwise would. 
The standard warning one should keep in mind when looking at evidence derived from cross-
sectional data applies: these findings are correlational, even though the theory predicting 
them indicates a causal relationship.  Further, as the data analyzed here are also restricted to 
only four countries, I cannot be sure of how these results will generalize to more culturally 
divergent areas.  There is some comfort in the numerous cultural, geographic, historical, and 
institutional differences between the four countries.  However, all of these countries are 
advanced democracies and thereby limit generalization.  More conclusive tests could be 
derived from data allowing individual measurement of perceived representation and trust in 
parliament over time and across a wider variety of countries. 
Data limitations notwithstanding, this evidence indicates that for those hoping to increase 
individuals trust in parliament, facilitating the perception that one is represented in 
parliament appears a promising tactic.  One possible method for doing this would be 
increasing the proportionality of the electoral system (Golder & Stramski, 2010; Huber & 
Powell, 1994; Powell, 2000, 2009), a method equated with increasing perceptions of voice in 
parliamentary representation (Dunn, 2012; Mill, 1861).  However, further evidence is 
necessary to determine whether the results obtained here apply more broadly, whether 
Switzerland in 2007 is an anomaly or indicative of a broader trend, and whether electoral 
systems designed to deliver more proportional results do actually increase individual 
perceptions of representation. 
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 Table 1: Difference between those who do and do not feel 
represented by a party in parliament 
ȴ means std.err. pw.corr ȴ p.prob 
Austria (2008) -0.220 0.104 0.076 0.242 
Netherlands (2002) -0.187 0.066 0.076 0.227 
New Zealand (2002) -0.319 0.056 0.106 0.361 
New Zealand (2008) -0.144 0.078 0.044 0.152 
Switzerland (2007) -0.049 0.063 0.016 0.050 
Note: Bolded values are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
 
  
 Table 2a: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament in Austria and Switzerland 
Austria (2008) Switzerland (2007) 
ɴ s.e. std.ɴ ɴ s.e. std.ɴ 
age 0.014 0.005 0.093 -0.005 0.002 -0.047 
education 0.101 0.037 0.099 0.022 0.017 0.029 
electoral winner 0.952 0.198 0.170 0.168 0.099 0.035 
gender (male) 0.007 0.176 0.001 -0.211 0.073 -0.061 
Left-Right Identification -0.045 0.037 -0.041 0.089 0.014 0.131 
perception of economy -0.418 0.111 -0.128 -0.236 0.052 -0.097 
political interest 0.290 0.089 0.114 -0.063 0.054 -0.024 
feel represented 1.065 0.180 0.202 0.103 0.072 0.029 
vote congruence 0.169 0.061 0.092  -0.020 0.023 -0.018 
constant 2.439 0.786 -- 6.868 0.336 -- 
r-squared 0.173 -- -- 0.034 -- -- 
observations 767 -- --  2420 -- -- 
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
  
 Table 2b: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament in New Zealand 
New Zealand (2002) New Zealand (2008) 
ɴ s.e. std.ɴ ɴ s.e. std.ɴ 
age 0.008 0.002 0.071 0.007 0.003 0.064 
education 0.198 0.019 0.200 0.092 0.016 0.148 
electoral winner 0.294 0.072 0.083 0.294 0.096 0.084 
gender (male) 0.200 0.063 0.057 -0.033 0.080 -0.009 
Left-Right Identification -0.019 0.015 -0.026 0.061 0.020 0.084 
perception of economy -0.354 0.044 -0.152 -0.179 0.052 -0.081 
political interest 0.041 0.047 0.016 0.361 0.058 0.147 
feel represented 0.248 0.067 0.067 0.572 0.102 0.129 
vote congruence 0.034 0.022 0.028  0.095 0.031 0.070 
constant 3.158 0.304 -- 2.238 0.417 -- 
r-squared 0.095 -- -- 0.097 -- -- 
observations 2883 -- --  1744 -- -- 
 
 
 
  
 Table 2c: Ordered Logistic Regression predicting Trust in 
Parliament in the Netherlands 
Netherlands (2002) 
ɴ s.e. O.R. 
age -0.008 0.004 0.992 
education 0.010 0.022 1.010 
electoral winner 0.143 0.135 1.154 
gender (male) 0.012 0.115 1.013 
Left-Right Identification -0.065 0.032 0.937 
perception of economy -0.350 0.083 0.704 
political interest 0.348 0.109 1.416 
feel represented 0.417 0.123 1.517 
vote congruence 0.073 0.049 1.076 
pseudo r-squared 0.027 -- -- 
observations 1408 -- -- 
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
  
 Table A1: Summary Statistics 
Austria (2008) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
trust in parliament 767 5.798 2.576 0 10 
age 767 51.983 17.478 18 96 
education 767 3.743 2.531 0 10 
electoral winner 767 0.694 0.461 0 1 
gender (male) 767 0.495 0.500 0 1 
Left-Right Identification 767 4.755 2.360 0 10 
perception of economy 767 3.180 0.788 1 5 
political interest 767 3.538 1.015 1 5 
feel represented 767 0.611 0.488 0 1 
vote congruence 767 8.712 1.406 1 10 
Netherlands (2002) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
trust in parliament 1408 2.726 0.574 1 4 
age 1408 49.564 15.833 18 97 
education 1408 6.298 2.804 1 11 
electoral winner 1408 0.530 0.499 0 1 
gender (male) 1408 0.496 0.500 0 1 
Left-Right Identification 1408 5.229 2.161 0 10 
perception of economy 1408 1.577 0.685 1 3 
political interest 1408 2.195 0.539 1 3 
feel represented 1408 0.705 0.456 0 1 
vote congruence 1408 8.997 1.129 3 10 
New Zealand (2002) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
trust in parliament 2883 4.335 1.753 0 8 
age 2883 50.995 15.329 18 100 
education 2883 4.870 1.766 1 8 
electoral winner 2883 0.435 0.496 0 1 
gender (male) 2883 0.503 0.500 0 1 
Left-Right Identification 2883 5.147 2.388 0 10 
perception of economy 2883 2.581 0.753 1 5 
political interest 2883 3.051 0.695 1 4 
feel represented 2883 0.656 0.475 0 1 
vote congruence 2883 8.725 1.430 0 10 
New Zealand (2008) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
trust in parliament 1744 5.225 1.737 0 9 
age 1744 53.607 16.140 18 100 
education 1744 5.467 2.792 0 10 
electoral winner 1744 0.423 0.494 0 1 
gender (male) 1744 0.493 0.500 0 1 
Left-Right Identification 1744 5.493 2.380 0 10 
perception of economy 1744 4.288 0.788 1 5 
political interest 1744 3.122 0.705 1 4 
feel represented 1744 0.811 0.391 0 1 
vote congruence 1744 8.895 1.281 0 10 
Switzerland (2007) Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
trust in parliament 2420 6.421 1.734 0 10 
age 2420 53.403 17.075 18 95 
education 2420 4.628 2.244 1 8 
electoral winner 2420 0.842 0.365 0 1 
gender (male) 2420 0.510 0.500 0 1 
Left-Right Identification 2420 5.271 2.551 0 10 
perception of economy 2420 2.019 0.714 1 5 
political interest 2420 3.147 0.670 1 4 
feel represented 2420 0.437 0.496 0 1 
vote congruence 2420 8.569 1.549 0 10 
 
 
 
  
 Table B1a: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament (Imputed) 
Austria (2008) Switzerland (2007) 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
age 0.012 0.004 -0.007 0.002 
education 0.067 0.030 0.039 0.014 
electoral winner 0.988 0.150 0.409 0.063 
gender (male) 0.055 0.142 -0.269 0.061 
Left-Right Identification -0.044 0.033 0.095 0.013 
perception of economy -0.496 0.088 -0.314 0.041 
political interest 0.329 0.068 0.211 0.039 
feel represented 0.917 0.147 0.059 0.065 
vote congruence 0.156 0.055   -0.027 0.029 
constant 2.856 0.647 6.034 0.313 
observations 1165 --   4392 -- 
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
 
  
 Table B1b: OLS Regression predicting Trust in Parliament (Imputed) 
New Zealand 
(2002) 
New Zealand 
(2008) 
ɴ s.e. ɴ s.e. 
age 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.001 
education 0.178 0.016 0.085 0.013 
electoral winner 0.320 0.060 0.466 0.081 
gender (male) 0.105 0.050 0.014 0.068 
Left-Right Identification -0.011 0.014 0.054 0.018 
perception of economy -0.382 0.036 -0.142 0.044 
political interest 0.052 0.039 0.426 0.047 
feel represented 0.370 0.055 0.690 0.078 
vote congruence 0.038 0.020   0.106 0.030 
constant 3.274 0.249 1.885 0.344 
observations 5783 --   3042 -- 
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
 
 
  
 Table B1c: Ordered Logistic Regression predicting Trust in 
Parliament (Imputed) 
Netherlands (2002) 
ɴ s.e. 
age -0.002 0.001 
education 0.003 0.006 
electoral winner 0.067 0.036 
gender (male) 0.020 0.031 
Left-Right Identification -0.021 0.008 
perception of economy -0.092 0.021 
political interest 0.107 0.028 
feel represented 0.139 0.032 
vote congruence 0.019 0.013 
constant 2.499 0.149 
observations 1907 -- 
Note: Bolded coefficients are significant at the p ч 0.05 level. 
 
